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The extensive debate on El Salvador in the media, the government, the 
academic community and among the public at large has focused almost 
entirely on the political and the moral issues involved in this crisis. While 
these issues are most definitely important, there is another set of issues, 
specifically certain military issues, that have not received adequate atten-
tion in the debate over El Salvador. The purpose of this article is to discuss 
the current crisis in light of the research that has been done on unconven-
tional war. Four issues will be discussed in the context of this research: 
first, the land reform program; secondly, the Salvadoran military; third, 
the effectiveness of American military involvement in El Salvador; and 
fourth, the outside support that the insurgents are receiving. Having 
analyzed these four issues, the article will conclude by briefly assessing the 
current military situation in El Salvador. 
The Land Reform Program 
Many of the students of counter-insurgency have argued that a key 
factor in defeating an insurgency is for the government threatened by the 
insurgency to undertake a program of land reform. This line of argument 
sees the success of revolutions in the 20th century in Mexico, China, 
Cuba and Russia as having been due primarily to the large number of 
landless peasants in these countries; and that therefore by giving peasants 
land a government can undercut efforts by revolutionary movements to 
gain support from the peasantry.1 The following three points must be kept 
in mind in analyzing the impact of the land reform program of El Salvador 
government on the course of the war. 
First, as a number of studies have indicated, even in a country not 
undergoing a desperate civil war it is very difficult to undertake a major 
social reform like substantially changing the pattern of land-holding. The 
peasants who benefit from land reform programs usually do not press for 
such reforms with anything like the determination and lev 1 of effort 
exerted by those who stand to lose from land reform programs. Moreover, 
even in a society at peace a land reform program will require a consider-
able commitment of governmental financial resources if the reform is 
going to be successful in establishing economically viable peasant enter-
prises, and land reform programs also (at least in the short run) usually 
result in reduced agricultural productivity; therefore, only a country whose 
economy is fairly healthy in the first place can afford to undertake such 
reforms.2 
In sum, even in peacetime it is difficult to implement a land reform 
program, and consequently many such programs initiated by various 
governments have achieved meager results. For example, the democratic 
governments of Belaunde in Peru (1963-1968) and Frei in Chile 
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(1964-1970) had very limited success in carrying out the major land reform 
programs that they had promised when running for office. 
Secondly, if land reform programs are difficult to undertake in a 
country at peace, then the difficulties of implementing such programs in a 
country such as El Salvador that is undergoing a major civil war are 
obviously enormously magnified. In the current civil war, where (for very 
different reasons) the extreme right and the extreme left have engaged in 
systematic assassination campaigns against anyone involved in the land 
reform program (i.e., peasants working for cooperatives, government 
officials, and foreign advisors), it is virtually impossible to implement such 
a program. Hence the argument over whether El Salvador's government is 
or is not sincerely committed to land reform misses the larger point that 
even if it were sincerely committed it is most unlikely that it could success-
fully carry out such a program. 
Finally, for two reasons considerable skepticism is appropriate with 
respect to the Reagan Administration's claim that the Salvadoran govern-
ment's land reform program will result in those sectors of the population 
now actively supporting the rebels starting to actively support the govern-
ment. First, this has not been the outcome in other land reform programs; 
studies of South Vietnam's land reform program of 1970-1972 and of 
Peru's land reform program of 1968-1975 have indicated that while the 
beneficiaries of such programs were often less inclined to support revolu-
tionary movements, at the same time these beneficiaries did not develop a 
strong sense of political loyalty to the government that had undertaken the 
land reform program. The peasants feelings toward the government in 
question were a mixture of neutrality, apathy, and a desire to be left 
alone.3 Second, given that El Salvador is a very densely populated country 
with a limited amount of arable land, the peasant cooperatives that the 
land reform program is supposed to establish can, at most, benefit only a 
minority of the rural population; i.e., there will be a vast number of 
peasants who will receive few or no benefits from the program. So while 
the main beneficiaries of the land reform program may become less sup-
portive of revolutionary movements, those who do not gain anything from 
this program could conceivably become more attracted to the cause of the 
insurgents in El Salvador out of bitterness at what they see as inequitable 
treatment by the government." 
The Military of El Salvador 
There are two major aspects of the Salvadoran military that are crucial 
to understand if one is to correctly evaluate the current military situation. 
The first of these aspects is that the Salvadoran military is a classic 
example of a heavily politicized military organization, in which the armed 
forces represent the key center of political power in a country. In assessing 
the situation, therefore, several facts must be kept in mind about poli-
ticized military forces such as those of El Salvador: 
1. Such military organizations generally have a rather low level of mili-
tary effectiveness. The reason for this is that in politicized military 
forces the criteria for promotion is not demonstrated competence in 
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military affairs but rather whether one is considered politically loyal 
and reliable by the existing military leadership. Moreover, in a 
heavily politicized armed forces the leadership clique frequently does 
not like to promote even politically loyal officers if they consider 
these officers too competent — they tend to regard all competent, 
professional officers who hold high rank as potential threats because 
whatever their current loyalties such officers could decide at some 
future date that the current leadership should be ousted, and that if 
they were to come to feel this way it is precisely because they are 
competent that they might well be able to oust the current ruling 
faction. With such a promotion system, it is not surprising that 
heavily politicized military organizations often perform dismally 
against their opponents — witness, for example, the poor level of per-
formance of the South Vietnamese military compared to that of the 
North Vietnamese, and the ease with which Castro's massively out-
numbered and outgunned guerrillas were able to inflict defeat after 
defeat on Batista's army.5 
2. It is extremely difficult for an outside power to try to reform and 
restructure such a politicized military force so as to make it more 
effective. For example, in Vietnam the Americans tried over and over 
again to convince the South Vietnamese government to purge the 
South Vietnamese officer corps of its large number of incompetent 
and corrupt officers. Such appeals had almost no impact. The leaders 
of South Vietnam knew that to try to purge the military would have 
been to upset a vast network of political arrangements and deals and 
to thus risk a great deal of political chaos and the possibility of a 
coup by disaffected elements. So, rather than take the risks involved 
in such an effort they preferred to accept the inefficiency that charac-
terized their military establishment.6 
3. Politicized military forces, because they lack high standards of 
professionalism, are much more prone to disintegrate than are pro-
fessional armies. Of course, any military force, no matter how pro-
fessional, can fall apart if it is subjected to enough pressure — 
witness the massive mutinies in the French Army in the spring of 
1917 and the disintegration of the Imperial German Army in the last 
months of 1918. However, while even very professional armies can 
fall apart if subjected to the terrible strains of a war like World War 
I, in three respects the problem of disintegration is even more acute 
for heavily politicized forces: first, because they are generally rather 
inefficient, the sort of reverses that a professional army could absorb 
without disintegrating are beyond their capabilities. For example, the 
rapid collapse in South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 was in large 
measure due to the fact that the South Vietnamese army was unable 
to carry out the admittedly difficult, but by no means impossible, 
task of an orderly retreat while under attack — instead the retreat 
became a total rout and the army fell to pieces. Second, because 
these forces not only have a corrupt and incompetent officer corps, 
but in addition these qualities are also endemic among the enlisted 
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ranks, morale and dedication is never very high, and hence they can 
disintegrate if subjected to very modest amounts of pressure: 
Witness, for example, the collapse of Batista's military in Cuba after 
being subjected to a very modest number of casualties by the various 
factions of the Cuban revolutionary movement.7 Thirdly, and 
related to the second point, even if a politicized military force does 
fight well for awhile, if it does start to disintegrate the process is often 
extremely rapid — witness the almost literally overnight collapse of 
the Nicaraguan National Guard once Somoza left the country and 
the Guard realized that the situation was hopeless.8 
The second major aspect of the Salvadoran military that must be kept in 
mind is that it is extremely difficult for this one (as it would be for any) to 
change the way that it has traditionally conducted military operations. For 
example, it has been pointed out in a number of studies that in the case of 
Vietnam the American military establishment tried to conduct the war in 
Vietnam as if it were fighting the war for which it had been preparing itself 
for several decades; namely, a conventional war in Central Europe. In 
Vietnam, therefore, American armed forces tried to fight a big-unit, high-
firepower war that was at best irrelevant and at worst counter-productive 
in relation to the insurgent war that was the reality of Vietnam.9 In fairness 
to the American military establishment, it should be mentioned that the 
problem in adjusting their doctrine to the realities of Vietnam was made 
almost impossible by the fact that the American political leadership had 
no clear idea of their goals or of what price the U.S. should be willing to 
pay for achieving them. In such a political vacuum it was virtually impos-
sible to formulate a coherent military strategy for conducting the war. 
Keeping in mind the difficulties that all militaries have in changing the 
way they have traditionally fought wars, it is almost certain that the 
American advisory teams in El Salvador (who, it is clear, are sincerely and 
determinedly trying to accomplish their mission) will have little success in 
modifying the long-established tendency of the Salvadoran military to 
react with massive and indiscriminate force to any sign of unrest or insur-
rection.10 
U.S. Military Intervention 
The key question concerning U.S. military involvement in El Salvador 
is: does it strengthen the military capabilities and effectiveness of the side 
that the U.S. is backing in the civil war? For the following reasons a strong 
case can be made for arguing that it is unlikely that the current level of 
American military assistance will significantly strengthen the government 
side. Of course, a large scale intervention of U.S. combat troops would 
clearly help El Salvador's government, but this does not appear to be a 
realistic option for the United States, given the strong Congressional and 
domestic opposition to the current level of American military involve-
ment. 
1. In almost all cases it is very difficult for a foreign nation to 
significantly upgrade and improve the fighting capabilities of another 
nation's military forces. In addition to the problems identified 
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earlier, there is the additional problem that the cultural, social and 
(most of the time) language barriers between the foreign advisors and 
the local military greatly complicate efforts at training and instruc-
tion. The severe problems that the American military encountered in 
trying to upgrade and improve the South Vietnamese armed forces 
have been extensively studied and documented. But it must be kept in 
mind that other countries have had similar problems: the Soviet-
trained Arab armies have generally had a dismal record against the 
Israelis; only direct Soviet military intervention in late 1979 pre-
vented the defeat of the Afghan military and its large contingent of 
Soviet military advisors at the hands of the rebels in Afghanistan; 
and the Soviet, Cuban and East European advisors in Angola have 
had little success in creating an effective Angolan military. 
2. In the specific case of El Salvador this general problem is aggravated 
by the dearth of knowledge in the U.S. about El Salvador. There is 
very little recent scholarly literature on the history, politics and cul-
ture of El Salvador; it has long been one of (if not the) least studied 
countries in Latin America. The result is that U.S. governmental and 
military officials have little detailed, objective knowledge to guide 
them in making decisions about what policies to pursue in El 
Salvador and about how to implement these policies once they are 
decided upon. 
3. Another reason for being rather skeptical of the effectiveness of 
American military involvement in El Salvador is that at present the 
U.S. Army is poorly prepared to conduct a counter-insurgency 
campaign. The post-mortems on the efforts in the 1960's by the U.S. 
political leadership to pressure the American forces into developing 
an effective counter-insurgency capability all agree that the military 
establishment made only very minor concessions to this pressure. 
Moreover, after the national trauma of Vietnam the U.S. military 
abolished almost all of those minor steps that it had taken to develop 
a counter-insurgency capability. The following facts starkly illustrate 
the lack of U.S. preparation for a counter-insurgency campaign: the 
year course of instruction at the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College devotes eight hours to unconventional war; Camber-
ley (the British Staff College) devotes 128 hours to unconventional 
war during its year course;" the Army Special Forces are seriously 
short of the skills needed for such a force and in recent years Special 
Forces training has emphasized waging unconventional military 
operations in general war situations rather than in counter-
insurgency campaigns;12 and the army has not made much of an 
effort to use the knowledge gained in Vietnam to guide it in any 
future unconventional war. A survey of the articles published in the 
last half of the 1970's in Military Review (published by the Army 
Staff College) and in Parameters (published by the Army War 
College) indicated that in this time period a total of five articles had 
been devoted to an examination of the experiences of the Vietnam 
war. In the same time period the combined total of articles on the 
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Revolutionary war and the Indian wars was easily twice that of the 
articles on Vietnam.13 
Outside Support for the Revolutionary Forces in El Salvador 
The issue of communist bloc aid to the rebels in El Salvador has been 
debated in a polarized and distorted manner. The Reagan Administration 
has sometimes tended to argue that the entire insurgency is due to external 
forces, while the opponents of U.S. policy have repeatedly challenged 
reports of outside military aid for the rebels, claiming that the insurgency 
is almost entirely due to internal political factors such as brutal repression 
and unjust social structures. 
The reality is that both of these analyses are serious oversimplifications 
of a much more complex question: what role does outside assistance play 
in creating and sustaining a major revolutionary movement? In brief, the 
answer is as follows: a revolutionary movement cannot be created solely 
by outside individuals and groups. As the IRA leadership itself was willing 
to admit, their 1956-1962 campaign against the British rule in Northern 
Ireland never developed into a major threat to the British government 
because Northern Ireland's Catholic population gave almost no support to 
the IRA. In contrast, by 1969-1970, after several years of community 
mobilization by the Civil Rights movement, by the Protestant backlash 
against this movement, and by a steady pattern of incidents and confronta-
tions with the British Army, the Catholic population of Northern Ireland 
was politicized enough and radicalized enough to lend a great deal of sup-
port to the Provisional IRA's campaign against the British.14 
Perhaps the starkest illustration of the error of trying to create a 
revolutionary movement solely by outside forces is the case of Che 
Guevara and the so-called "foco" theory. In brief, the foco theory, as 
developed by Guevara and his friend Regis Debray, held that a small force 
of trained revolutionaries (the foco) could create a successful revolution 
anywhere in Latin America by going into the countryside, beginning a 
campaign of guerrilla war, gradually creating a bigger and bigger guerrilla 
force, and then after a few years defeating the army of the ruling class and 
establishing a revolutionary government.15 The repeated failures of this 
foco strategy all over Latin America in the 1960's did not shake Guevara's 
faith in his theory — so strongly did he believe in his theory that in 1967 he 
was killed in a hopeless campaign to overthrow the Bolivian government 
by establishing a foco in the mountains of Bolivia.16 
However, while outside elements cannot generate the popular support 
that a revolutionary movement needs if it is going to have a chance of suc-
cess, this is not to deny that outside assistance is usually essential for such 
a movement to sustain itself and to have a chance to come to power. For 
example, at the time of the September 1978 uprising against Somoza, the 
Sandinista movement clearly had massive popular support; but Somoza's 
National Guard was able to put down this uprising because the insurgents 
were so poorly armed. The Nicaraguan revolutionaries learned from the 
failure of the September uprising; they spent the next several months 
building up their supplies of arms. The success of the final Sandinista of-
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fensive in the spring of 1979 was in large part due to the fact that in this se-
cond round of fighting the rebels were much better armed than they had 
been during the earlier insurrection.17 Another example of the importance 
of outside assistance to the survival of even mass-based revolutionary 
movements is the rapid collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in early 
1975 when the United States and Iran cut off aid to the Kurds.18 
There are many potential sources of outside aid to a revolutionary 
movement that has the right foreign connections, and hence the debate 
about the degree of communist bloc involvement with the rebels in El 
Salvador overlooks the point that even if it were possible to cut off what 
aid the rebels do undoubtedly get from communist bloc countries, the 
rebels have many other sources. They have ties to a number of leftist but 
non-communist movements such as the Socialist International, the left 
wing of the Catholic Church's various national churches, and many of the 
more liberal Protestant religious groups in the United States and 
elsewhere. They also have ties in certain non-communist countries such as 
Mexico. In brief, the fact that the rebels in El Salvador have many poten-
tial and actual sources of aid besides communist bloc countries and parties 
means that a cutoff of communist aid would not destroy the insurgency; 
with the financial aid the Salvadoran rebels get from non-communist 
sources they could easily secure all the arms they need on the international 
arms market. 
Conclusion: A Brief Summary of the Current Military Situation 
The current military situation in El Salvador can be summed up by the 
following three key points: first, the revolutionaries in El Salvador have a 
mass base of popular support. Given the virtual impossibility of 
implementing reforms while the chaos in El Salvador continues, it is most 
unlikely that the government will be able to erode the opposition's mass 
base through reforms. The rebels should have no great difficulty getting 
sufficient arms. In sum, the revolutionary movement in El Salvador is a 
powerful force that will be difficult to defeat. 
Secondly, the military situation of El Salvador's government is extreme-
ly precarious. The Salvadoran military forces are not efficient enough to 
adequately prosecute the war. Moreover, this military force is the sort that 
could disintegrate quickly; this possibility means that the present detach-
ment of U.S. advisors in El Salvador and the military aid that the U.S. is 
giving is needed as much to sustain the Salvadoran military's morale (by 
giving them a sense of having a powerful backer) as to contain the 
revolutionaries' military threat. 
Finally, the very vulnerability and fragility of the Salvadoran military 
puts the U.S. in a terrible dilemma: if the military continues to engage in 
gross human rights violations, opposition to American involvement in El 
Salvador will grow in the Congress and among the public. In light of the 
outcome of the elections, this may happen anyway. On the other hand, 
American pressure for a reduction in human rights violations could be 
taken by the Salvadoran military as an implied threat of U.S. withdrawal, 
thereby possibly leading to the collapse and disintegration of this military. 
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Either way, the U.S. is likely to confront a difficult and potentially divisive 
foreign policy decision with implications for American policy throughout 
Central America. 
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